础耻迟丑辞谤蝉:听Brian Rubineau, Yisook Lim and Michael Neblo
Publication: Social Networks, Vol. 56, January 2019
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Published on: 5 Sep 2018
础耻迟丑辞谤蝉:听Hamid Etemad and Christian Keen
笔耻产濒颈肠补迟颈辞苍:听International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2018
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Published on: 5 Sep 2018
础耻迟丑辞谤蝉:听Manaf Zargoush, Mehmet Gumus, Vedat Verter,听Stella S. Daskalopoulou
Publication: Production and Operations Management, Forthcoming
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Limited guidance is available for providing patient鈥恠pecific care to hypertensive patients, although this chronic condition is the leading risk factor for cardiovascular diseases. To address this issue, we develop an analytical model that takes into account the most relevant risk factors including age, sex, blood pressure, diabetes status, smoking habits, and blood cholesterol. Using the Markov Decision Process framework, we develop a model to maximize expected quality鈥恆djusted life years, as well as characterize the optimal sequence and combination of antihypertensive medications. Assuming the physician uses the standard medication dose for each drug, and the patient fully adheres to the prescribed treatment regimen, we prove that optimal treatment policies exhibit a threshold structure. Our findings indicate that our recommended thresholds vary by age and other patient characteristics, for example (1) the optimal thresholds for all medication prescription are nonincreasing in age, and (2) the medications need to be prescribed at lower thresholds for males who smoke than for males who have diabetes. The improvements in quality鈥恆djusted life years associated with our model compare favorably with those obtained by following the British Hypertension Society's guideline, and the gains increase with the severity of risk factors. For instance, in both genders (although at different rates), diabetic patients gain more than non鈥恉iabetic patients. Our sensitivity analysis results indicate that the optimal thresholds decrease if the medications have lower side鈥恊ffects and vice versa.
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Published on: 8 Aug 2018
础耻迟丑辞谤蝉:听Mohammad E. Nikoofal, Mehmet Gumus
Publication: Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Vol. 20, No. 3, Summer 2018
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Published on: 7 Aug 2018
Nathan Yang, Assistant Professor in Marketing, selected participant in joint Quebec and China seminar Big Data and Management.
As part of the collaborative agreement between the Fonds de recherche du Qu茅bec 鈥� Soci茅t茅 et culture (FRQSC) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), a delegation of Qu茅bec researchers will take part in a seminar on the use of big data in management science in Nanjing, China, from September 18 to 20, 2018.
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Published on: 23 Jul 2018
Congratulations to Matissa Hollister, Assistant Professor in Organizational Behaviour, awarded the 2018 SSHRC Insight Grant 鈥淪hould I Stay or Should I Go 鈥� the Consequences of Job Mobility on Future Hiring Prospects鈥�.
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Published on: 23 Jul 2018
Congratulations to Yu Ma, Associate Professor in Marketing, Laurette Dub茅, Professor in Marketing and听Nathan Yang, Assistant Professor in听Marketing, on being awarded the 2018 SSHRC Insight Grant 鈥淎n Empirical Investigation of Digital Goods Consumption and Its Impact on Word-of-Mouth Marketing鈥�.
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Published on: 23 Jul 2018
Congratulations to Myung-Soo Jo, and Emine Sarigollu,听Professors in Marketing, on being awarded the 2018 成人VR视频 Sustainability Systems Initiative (MSSI) New Opportunities award 鈥淔rom a Throwaway Society into a Sustainable Society: A Consumer Perspective鈥�.
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Published on: 23 Jul 2018
Congratulations to Myung-Soo Jo, and Emine Sarigollu,听Professors in Marketing,听on being awarded the 2018 SSHRC Insight Grant 鈥淭he Demand and Supply Sides of Corruption鈥�.听
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Published on: 23 Jul 2018
础耻迟丑辞谤蝉:听Mohammad E. Nikoofal,听Mehmet Gumus
Publication: Production and Operations Management, Forthcoming
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This paper develops a dyadic supply chain model with one buyer who contracts the manufacturing of a new product to a supplier. Due to the lack of experience in manufacturing, the extent of supply risk is unknown to both the buyer and supplier before the time of contract. However, after the contract is accepted, the supplier may invest in a diagnostic test to acquire information about his true reliability, and use this information when deciding on a process improvement effort. Using this setting, we identify both operational and strategic benefits and costs of diagnostic test. Operationally, it helps the supplier to take the first-best level of improvement effort, which would increase efficiency of the total supply chain. Strategically, it enables the buyer to reduce the agency costs associated with implementing process improvement on the supplier. Besides these benefits, diagnostic test increases the degree of information asymmetry along the supply chain. This in turn provides the supplier with proprietary information, whose rent would be demanded from the buyer in equilibrium. Benefit-cost analysis reveals two key factors in determining the value of diagnostic test: (i) degree of endogenous information asymmetry between supply chain firms, and (ii) the relative cost of diagnostic test with respect to process improvement cost. Our results indicate that when both are high, the mere presence of diagnostic test can result in less reliable supply chain. This implies that when incentives are not properly aligned, information asymmetry amplified due to diagnostic test neutralizes all its benefits.
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Published on: 23 Jul 2018
础耻迟丑辞谤蝉:听Derek D. Wang, Shanling Li, Toshiyuki Sueyoshi
Publication: Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 196, September 2018
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Published on: 23 Jul 2018
Authors: Michelle Y. Lu , Jiwoong Shin
Publication: Marketing Science, Vol. 37, No. 3, May-June 2018
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When a firm introduces a radical innovation, consumers are unaware of the product鈥檚 uses and benefits. Moreover, consumers are unsure of whether they even need the product. In this situation, we consider the role of marketing communication as generating consumers鈥� need recognition and thus market demand for a novel product. In particular, we model marketing communication as a two-sided process that involves both firms鈥� and consumers鈥� costly efforts to transmit and assimilate a novel product concept. When the marketing communication takes on a two-sided process, we study a firm鈥檚 different information disclosure strategies for its radical innovation. We find that sharing innovation, instead of extracting a higher rent by keeping the idea secret, can be optimal. A firm may benefit from the presence of a competitor and its communication effort. The innovator can share its innovation so that competitors can also benefit, which encourages rivals to enter the market. The presence of such competition guarantees a higher surplus for consumers, which can induce greater consumer effort in a two-sided communication process. Moreover, the increased consumer effort, in turn, prompts complementarity in the communication process and lessens the potential free-riding effect in communication between firms. Additionally, it encourages the rival firm to exert more effort, especially when the role of consumers becomes more important. Sharing innovation with a rival serves as a mechanism to induce more efforts in a two-sided communication process.
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Published on: 23 Jul 2018
Authors: Eduard Calvo, Ruomeng Cui and Juan Camilo Serpa
Publication: Management Science, Volume 65, Issue 12, December 2019, Pages 5651-5675.
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In the U.S., four in ten public infrastructure projects report delays or cost overruns. To tackle this problem, regulators often scrutinize the project contractor鈥檚 operations. We investigate the causal effect of government oversight on project efficiency by gleaning 262,857 projects that span seventy-one U.S. federal agencies and 54,739 contractors. Our identification strategy exploits a regulatory bylaw: if a project鈥檚 anticipated budget exceeds a threshold value, the contractor鈥檚 operations are subject to surveillance from independent procurement officers; otherwise, these operational checks are waived. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that oversight is obstructive to the project鈥檚 operations, especially when the contractor (i) has no prior experience in public projects, (ii) is paid with a fixed-price contract that includes performance-based incentives, and (iii) performs a labor-intensive task. In contrast, oversight is least obstructive 鈥� or beneficial 鈥� when the contractor (i) is experienced, (ii) is paid with a time-and-materials contract, and (iii) performs a machine-intensive task.
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Published on: 10 Jul 2018
Karla Sayegh, PhD Student in Strategy & Organization, received the best student paper award for her thesis work at the 11th International Organizational Behaviour in Health Care (OBHC) Conference held in Montreal from May 13 鈥�16, 2018. 听
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Published on: 14 Jun 2018
Authors: Robert Bray, Juan Camilo Serpa and Ahmet Colak
Publication: Management Science, Volume 65, Issue 9, September 2019, Pages 4079-4099.
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We explore the effect of supply chain proximity on product quality by merging four independent data sources from the automotive industry, collecting: (i) auto component defect rates, (ii) upstream component factory locations, (iii) downstream assembly plant locations, and (iv) product-level links connecting the upstream and downstream factories. Combining these four datasets allows us to trace the flow of 27,807 products through 529 supplier factories and 275 assembly plants. We estimate that increasing the distance between an upstream component factory and a downstream plant by an order of magnitude increases the component鈥檚 expected defect rate by 3.9%. We also find that shorter inter-factory spans are associated with more rapid product quality improvements, and that supply chain distance is more detrimental to quality when automakers: (i) produce early generation models or (ii) high-end products, (iii) when they buy components with more complex configurations, or (iv) when they source from suppliers who invest relatively little in research and development
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Published on: 11 Jun 2018
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