Who鈥檚 Watching? Accountability in Different Audit Regimes and the Effects on Auditors鈥� Professional Skepticism
Authors: 贵濒辞谤颈补苍听贬辞辞蝉,听 闯辞谤颈别苍听尝辞耻颈蝉别听笔谤耻颈箩蝉蝉别谤蝉, Michel聽W.聽Lander
Publication: Journal of Business Ethics, Forthcoming
Abstract:
The European Commission has suggested that the use of joint audits should lead to improved auditor skepticism and鈥攂y extension鈥攁udit quality, through increased accountability. However, archival research does not find support for improved audit quality in a joint audit setting. To better understand the relationship between accountability in different review regimes and auditors鈥� judgments, we examine the behavioral effect of implementing a joint audit relative to other review regimes based on a 1聽脳聽3 experimental design. Forty-seven senior auditors and partners from a Big Four firm performed a going concern evaluation task under one of three review regimes: the joint audit, the internal review, and the no review regime. Notwithstanding the difference in the audiences to which auditors are accountable, there is no difference in the judgment process. In terms of their judgment outcome, however, auditors in the joint audit setting were the least skeptical in their judgment of the going concern assumption. Overall, we suggest that the joint audit may lead to unintended behavioral consequences.
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