Prime Minister Justin Trudeau鈥檚 recent appearance at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders鈥� summit in San Francisco neatly coincided with the one-year anniversary of the release of Canada鈥檚 Indo-Pacific strategy.
Published last November to great fanfare, the strategy was Canada鈥檚 response to the growing聽聽of the region, home to 65 per cent of the world鈥檚 population and 40 per cent of the world鈥檚 combined gross domestic product.
It鈥檚 a region that offers great opportunities for Canada, which possesses not only a long Pacific coastline but also a population with many people who have close family ties to the region.
The ambitious strategy identified five objectives: promoting peace and security; expanding trade and investment; connecting and investing in people; building a sustainable, green future; and forging partnerships. Under each of these objectives was a long 鈥渢o-do鈥� list of specific initiatives and commitments. Supporting it all was聽聽over five years.
Too early for full judgment 鈥� but time to take some stock
While passing full judgment on the Indo-Pacific strategy only one year after its launch would be folly, it is not too early to conduct an initial stocktaking. There is some good news, although serious warning signs concerning the longer-term health of the strategy are also beginning to appear.
The federal government should heed these signs and begin to take steps to address some of the broader challenges surrounding the country鈥檚 key relationships in the region as well as its security presence.
Let鈥檚 begin with the good news.
Progress has been steady if modest. It is never easy getting 鈥渕oney out the door鈥� early in support of large-scale government strategies and it has been no different in this case.
The focus has been on conducting cabinet-level聽; launching trade missions; establishing strategic dialogues with partners such as the U.S., South Korea, Australia and ASEAN; and appointing diplomats to new high-level positions, such as the聽聽and the Indo-Pacific trade representative.
The first full-scale Team Canada trade mission to Japan was a notable success, featuring more than 160 Canadian organizations from diverse sectors including clean technologies, information and communication technologies, and agriculture and creative industries.
Beyond visits, announcements and appointments, there have also been a few other tangible outcomes.
For example, the Royal Canadian Navy聽聽an additional warship and a support vessel to the region.
Global Affairs has opened a visa operations centre in Manila. Fisheries and Oceans has participated in its first mission against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the region.
The government has established and begun staffing the new Indo-Pacific agriculture and agri-food office in Manila. Negotiations on a foreign investment promotion and protection agreement with Taiwan have been completed.
Now the bad news
These early steps are encouraging and could be laying the foundation for greater progress. Time will tell. But they should not obscure much larger challenges, some of the government鈥檚 own making, which are already beginning to emerge.
First is the precarious state of Canada鈥檚 relationship with India following the prime minister鈥檚 statement about聽聽in the killing of a Canadian Sikh activist in June.
India鈥檚 increasing strategic and economic clout makes it a virtual lynchpin of the strategy. Canada wants to work with Delhi in areas of common interest, including security and trade. But current tensions 鈥� notwithstanding recent signs of de-escalation 鈥� make such prospects difficult and put the entire strategy at risk if not addressed soon.
Second is the relationship with Beijing. While the strategy identifies China as a 鈥済lobally disruptive power,鈥� it also argues that country鈥檚 size and influence make co-operation with the West essential in addressing the world鈥檚 key problems, such as climate change and global health.
China鈥檚 economy is also hugely attractive to Canadian business. The strategy effectively calls for Canada to walk a tightrope between competition and co-operation with Beijing.
Events over the last year, including allegations of聽聽by China, suggest the relationship is only worsening and that this tightrope is becoming increasingly dangerous to walk. Such an approach may not be sustainable.
Third, Canada remains missing from regional bodies such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), the AUKUS defence pact and the quadrilateral security dialogue (the Quad).
The Business Council of Canada鈥檚 frustration at the APEC summit over Canada鈥檚 exclusion from IPEF聽聽Canada can continue to deflect criticism concerning its absence from these bodies, but such denials won鈥檛 hide the fact that the country is being sidelined on important regional security and economic discussions and is suffering serious damage to its reputation.
Finally, the chief of the defence staff聽聽that the Canadian Armed Forces would be challenged to sustain its increased presence in the region. The frigates are reaching the end of their lifespan and balancing their deployment globally will become increasingly difficult.
With the long-promised defence policy update still missing in action and with significant increases to the defence budget unlikely, Canadians are left wondering whether military options that could play a pivotal role in the region 鈥� including frigates, submarines and maritime patrol aircraft 鈥� will be upgraded or replaced anytime soon.
Two approaches for India and China
So what should Ottawa do in response to these challenges?
It should begin by repairing its relationship with India as quickly as possible. While Delhi must be held accountable for any complicity in the murder of a Canadian citizen, the government must also find a way to work with India moving forward.
Not only is this relationship key to the Indo-Pacific strategy, but India is also critical for the West鈥檚 broader strategy of confronting an increasingly aggressive China in the region.
Close co-operation on this issue with the United States 鈥� which disclosed in a聽聽Delhi鈥檚 potential involvement in assassination plots on American soil, as well as supporting Canada鈥檚 statement about the killing in B.C. 鈥� will be essential. Ottawa and Washington must jointly press for accountability while focusing on the overarching objective of maintaining India as a partner, not an adversary.
Canada鈥檚 difficult relationship with China will not be a problem solved overnight. All Western countries are grappling with China鈥檚 bellicose behaviour. However, Australia and others are making greater efforts to find common ground.
As Ottawa鈥檚 relationship with Beijing continues on a downward spiral, the government needs to explain how it will walk that thin tightrope described in the Indo-Pacific strategy.
Canada must make a more concerted effort to join key regional bodies. The government should make joining IPEF, AUKUS and the Quad explicit policy goals, then devote the necessary resources to achieving these goals as soon as possible.
Lastly, the government should unveil its defence update and explicitly state how the Canadian Forces will support the Indo-Pacific strategy.
In a perfect world, the update would lay out a clear path for the procurement of new frigates, submarines and maritime patrol aircraft to help support security in the region. If that is not in the cards, then the government needs to explain how the security objectives of the Indo-Pacific strategy will be implemented down the road.
In the meantime, other crises continue to proliferate around the world, including wars in Ukraine, the Middle East and Africa. Canada has global interests but limited resources. It will therefore require a delicate balancing act to ensure the Indo-Pacific strategy does not wither on the vine.
About the Authors
Vincent Rigby聽is the Slater Family Professor of Practice at Max Bell School of Public Policy. He served in the Canadian public service for 30 years, focusing on security and intelligence, foreign policy, defence, and development issues. His last position was as National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister from 2020 to 2021.聽
聽is an MPP alumni and public policy columnist for Canadian and Bangladeshi media platforms, focusing on the Indo-Pacific region. He is currently an urban fellow researcher with the City of Toronto.
