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Natalie Stoljar

Academic title(s): 

Professor & Director, Institute for Gender, Sexuality and Feminist Studies;

Joint appointment with Department of Equity, Ethics & Policy (Faculty of Medicine & Health Sciences)

Natalie Stoljar
Contact Information
Address: 

855 Sherbrooke St. W.
Montreal, Quebec
H3A 2T7

Phone: 
514-398-1331
Email address: 
natalie.stoljar [at] mcgill.ca
Office: 
Leacock 925
Office hours: 

By appointment.

Research areas: 
Feminist Philosophy
Philosophy of Law
Political Philosophy
Moral Philosophy
Biography: 

Natalie Stoljar received a BA (Hons) LLB (Hons) from the University of Sydney and a PhD from Princeton University. She聽came to 成人VR视频 in 2006 after holding positions at the Australian National University, Monash University and the University of Melbourne.听She holds a joint appointment in the Department of Equity, Ethics & Policy, Faculty of Medicine & Health Sciences. She was Chair of the Department from 2008-2012 and Interim Director of the Institute for Health and Social Policy in 2018-2019. She has been Director of the Institute for Gender, Sexuality and Feminist Studies since 2020.听Prof. Stoljar is an Associate Editor of Philosophical Studies and Subject Editor for Gender and Feminism for The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Her research is in feminist philosophy, social and political philosophy, and the philosophy of law. In social and political philosophy, her work focuses on relational conceptions of autonomy.听She is co-editor (with Catriona Mackenzie) of Relational Autonomy. Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self聽(OUP 2000) and (with Kristin Voigt) of聽Autonomy and Equality: Relational Approaches (Routledge 2021). In feminist philosophy, she has written on feminist metaphysics, especially gender essentialism, realism and nominalism. In the philosophy of law, her research interests include legal interpretation, constitutional interpretation and judicial review, and the methodology of law. A recent project in the philosophy of law concerns procedural justice and the ethical dimensions of legal processes such as those of trust and respect.听Her research has been funded by SSHRC Insight Grants, e.g. 'Silencing, Objectification and Negative Social Scripts. Do They Undermine Autonomy?' (2016-2021), and a SSHRC Insight Development Grant (with Kristin Voigt), 'Relational Equality and Relational Autonomy' (2016-2019).

Prof. Stoljar regularly teaches the Department鈥檚 philosophy of law courses (PHIL 348 and PHIL 648).

Selected publications: 

  • Stoljar, N. Accepted. 鈥楧istributive and Relational Vulnerability,鈥� in C. Porro and C. Straehle (eds), Vulnerability and Relational Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. TBA

  • Stoljar, N. In Press. 鈥楽ocial Justice,鈥� in K. Koslicki and M. Raven (eds), Routledge Handbook of Essence in Philosophy聽(New York: Routledge), pp. TBA

  • Stoljar, N. In Press. 鈥楾he Perfectionist Challenge to Relational Theories of Justice,鈥� in J. D. Rooney and P. Zoll (eds), Beyond Classical Liberalism. Freedom and the Good (New York: Routledge), pp. TBA

  • Stoljar, N. 2023. 鈥楽ocial, Moral or Ameliorative? Understanding Constraints on Legal Interpretation,鈥� in T. Bustamante and M. Martin (eds), New Essays on the Fish-Dworkin Debate (Oxford: Hart Publishing), pp. 183-204.

  • Stoljar, N. 2023. 鈥楧ialogical Trust and Procedural Justice,鈥� in D. Collins, I. V. Jovanovi膰 and M. Alfano (eds), The Moral Psychology of Trust (Lexington Books), pp. 159-177.

  • Stoljar, N. 2022. 鈥業neffective Intentions. How Oppressive Scripts Undermine Autonomy,鈥� in B. Colburn (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Autonomy (New York: Routledge), pp. 257-269.

  • Stoljar, N. & C. Mackenzie. 2022. 鈥楻elational Autonomy in Feminist Bioethics,鈥� in W. Rogers, S.Carter, V. Entwistle, C. Mills, and J. L. Scully (eds), Routledge Handbook of Feminist Bioethics (New York: Routledge), pp. 71-83.

  • Stoljar, N. and K. Voigt.听2021. 'Regarding Oneself as an Equal,' in N. Stoljar and K. Voigt (eds), Autonomy and Equality: Relational Approaches (New York: Routledge), pp.听145-168.

  • Stoljar, N. 2021. 鈥楢utonomy: Relational Conceptions.鈥� In聽G. Laurie, E. Dove, A. Ganguli-Mitra, C. McMillan, E. Postan, N. Sethi, and A. Sorbie (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Health Research Regulation聽(Cambridge University Press), pp.听27-36.

  • Stoljar, N. 2020. '' Health Care Analysis

  • Stoljar, N. 2020. 'Racial Profiling as Pejorative Discrimination,' in聽D. Meyerson, C. Mackenzie and T. MacDermott (eds), Procedural Justice and Relational Theory. Empirical, Philosophical, and Legal Perspectives聽(Routledge), pp. 213-231.听

  • Stoljar, N. 2019.听' Australasian Philosophical Review 3, no. 1: 1-4.

  • Stoljar, N, 2018. 鈥�,鈥� in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy聽(Winter 2018 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.)

  • Stoljar, N. 2018. 鈥楪ender and the Unthinkable.鈥� In P. Garavaso (ed.),聽The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Feminism聽(Bloomsbury), pp. 123-143.

  • Stoljar, N. 2018. 鈥樷�� in K. Hutchinson, C. Mackenzie and聽M. Oshana聽(eds)聽The Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility聽(Oxford University Press), pp. 231-252.

  • Stoljar, N. 2017. 鈥�,鈥� In K. Lippert-Rasmussen (ed.),聽The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination聽(Routledge), pp. 68-79.

  • Stoljar, N. 2017. 鈥楻elational Autonomy and Perfectionism鈥櫬�Moral Philosophy and Politics:聽4: 27鈥�41.

  • Stoljar, N. 2016. 鈥楾he Metaphysics of Gender,鈥� in K. Lippert-Rasmussen, K. Brownlee and D. Coady (eds),聽Blackwell Companion to Applied Philosophy聽(Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 211-223.

  • Stoljar, N. 2015. 鈥楲iving Constantly at Tiptoe Stance:聽Social Scripts, Psychological Freedom and Autonomy,鈥� in M. Oshana (ed.),聽Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression.听Philosophical Perspectives聽(Routledge), pp. 105-123.

  • Stoljar, N. 2014. 鈥楢utonomy and Adaptive Preference Formation,鈥� in M. Piper and A. Veltman (eds)聽Autonomy, Oppression and Gender聽(Oxford University Press), pp. 227-254.

  • Stoljar, N. 2013. 鈥榃hat Do We Want Law to Be? Philosophical Analysis and the Concept of Law,鈥� in W. Waluchow and S. Sciaraffa (eds),聽Philosophical Foundations of The Nature of Law聽(Oxford University Press), pp. 230-260.

  • Stoljar, N. 2012. 鈥樷�櫬�Problema. Anuario de Filosof铆a y Teor铆a del Derecho聽6: 51-79.

  • Stoljar, N. 2011. 'Informed Consent and Relational Conceptions of Autonomy鈥櫬�The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy聽36: 275-384.

  • Stoljar, N. 2011. 鈥�,鈥� in C. Witt (ed.) Feminist Metaphysics. Explorations in the Ontology of Sex, Gender and the Self聽(Springer Verlag), pp. 27-46.

  • Stoljar, N. 2009. 鈥�,鈥� Problema. Anuario de Filosof铆a y Teor铆a del Derecho聽3: 101-132.

  • Stoljar, N. 2003. 鈥業nterpretation, Indeterminacy and Authority: Some Recent Controversies in the Philosophy of Law,鈥� Journal of Political Philosophy聽11: 470-498.

  • Stoljar, N. 2001. 鈥榁agueness, Counterfactual Intentions and Legal Interpretation,鈥� Legal Theory聽7: 445-463.

  • Stoljar, N. 2000 鈥楢utonomy and the Feminist Intuition.鈥� In C. Mackenzie and N. Stoljar (eds) Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self聽(Oxford: Oxford University Press).

  • Stoljar, N. 1998. 鈥楥ounterfactuals in Interpretation: The Case Against Intentionalism,鈥� Adelaide Law Review聽20: 29-55.

  • Stoljar, N. 1995. 鈥�,鈥� Philosophical Topics: 23 261-93.

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